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Henri Bortoft (1938–2012) 
We devote much of this issue to physicist, philoso-
pher, and science educator Henri Bortoft, who died 
on December 29, 2012, at his home in England. He 
was 73 years old. Throughout the years, we have 
covered Bortoft‘s work in EAP because it speaks to 
a particular mode of environmental encounter that 
might be called a ―phenomenology of the natural 
world.‖ His best known writing is the influential 
Wholeness of Nature, published in 1996. His last 
work, released shortly before his death, is Taking 
Appearance Seriously (see EAP, winter 2013).  
In the early 1960s, Bortoft worked with British 
philosopher J. G. Bennett on the development of 
―systematics‖—a method of encountering and un-
derstanding whereby one might explore the various 
aspects of a phenomenon through the qualitative 
significance of number. Doing his doctoral research, 
Bortoft worked with British physicist David Bohm 
to consider the relationship between quantum me-
chanics and an understanding of wholeness. 
 In later professional life, Bortoft was invited by 
biologist Brian Goodwin to teach in the innovative 
graduate program in holistic science at Schumacher 
College, in Totnes, UK. There and elsewhere, many 
students were deeply touched by Bortoft‘s singular 
instructional style whereby he introduced the phe-
nomenological approach phenomenologically. 
 Bortoft‘s work is cen-
tral to EAP because he pre-
sents an empathetic way of 
encountering phenomena 
whereby they ―reveal‖ 
themselves in an accurate 
and comprehensive way. 
One of his most important 
models for seeing and un-
derstanding was Goethe‘s 
way of science, which Bortoft recast as a ―phenom-
enology and hermeneutics of nature.‖ He would 
regularly repeat Goethe‘s dictum, ―One instance is 
often worth a thousand, bearing all within itself.‖ 
 In this issue of EAP, we include two tributes—
the first by EAP Editor David Seamon, who studied 
with Bortoft in the early 1970s; the second, by phi-
losopher Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, who has dis-
cussed Bortoft‘s work in articles and books. We al-
so reprint two of Bortoft‘s writings: first, a portion 
of his 1971 article on authentic wholeness; and, se-
cond, a 2011 article Bortoft wrote for the Journal of 
Holistic Science, published by Schumacher College 
and Earthscan. We thank his widow, Jackie 
Bortoft, for allowing us to include this work here. 
 Also in this issue is an update from Torontoian 
Robert Fabian, who describes his recent citizen 
involvement with development along downtown 
Toronto‘s Yonge Street. We end with a cartoon en-
visioned by designer J. Kevin Byrne. 
 
Below: A drawing from Edwin Abbott Abbott’s 1884 Flat-
land—one of Henri Bortoft‘s favorite examples to illustrate 
that the world we take for granted may have unsuspected, new 
aspects. ―Flatland‖ refers to an imaginary world of two dimen-
sions inhabited by various geometric creatures like squares 
and hexagons. An important part of the story is the appearance 
of a ―Sphere‖ from the realm of three dimensions, who the 
Flatlanders can only understand as a point and expanding and 
contracting circles. See Bortoft‘s account, p. 13. 
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We are grateful to the following readers who, since 
the winter issue, have contributed more than the 
base subscription for 2013. 
 
Tom Barrie    Rosmarie Bogner 
Margaret Boschetti   Suzanne Bott 
L. J. Evenden    Kirk Gastinger 
Marie Gee    Susan Ingham 
Ted Lowitz    The Nature Institute 
Jenny Quillien    Ingrid Leman Stefanovic 
Christian Sweningsen  Karen Wilson Baptist 
 
Items of Interest 
The 44
th
 annual meeting of the Environmental De-
sign Research Association (EDRA) will be held in 
Providence, Rhode Island, May 29–June 1, 2013. 
EAP is sponsoring one symposium, ―Conceptual 
Issues in Place Research: Concerns, Prospects, and 
Points of Contention.‖ Presenters include Maria 
Lewicka, Faculty of Psychology, University of 
Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland (―Being or Becoming: 
What Do Relations between People and Places Tell 
Us about the Meaning of Place?‖); and EAP Editor 
David Seamon (―Place as Human-Immersion-in-
World: How to Describe the Lived Wholeness of 
Place Phenomenologically without Breaking it into 




 annual International Human Science Re-
search Conference will be held August 13–16, 
2013, at Aalborg University, in Aalborg, Denmark. 
Psychotherapist Linda Finlay and EAP Editor Da-
vid Seamon are organizing a symposium, ―Engag-
ing Relational Encounters: Silences, Clients, Places 
and Art Works.‖ Besides Seamon and Finlay, pre-
senters include philosopher Robert Mugerauer and 
psychologist Eva Simms. www.ihsrc.aau.dk/ 
 
Citations Received 
Iris Aravot & Eran Neuman, eds., 2011. Ar-
chiPhen: Some Approaches and Interpreta-
tions of Phenomenology in Architecture. 
 
This volume includes 18 conference presentations from the 
first ―Architecture and Phenomenology‖ conference in Haifa, 
Israel, in May, 2007. Contributors include: Iris Aravot; Jim 
Baek; Benoit Jacquet; Eran Neuman; and Nili Portugali.  
 
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic & Stephen Bede 
Scharper, eds., 2012. The Natural City: Re-
Envisioning the Built Environment.  Toron-
to: Univ. of Toronto Press. 
 
Edited by a philosopher and anthropologist, this volume is ―an 
interdisciplinary collection of essays that merges architectural 
theory and urban design with philosophy, religion, humanism, 
and environmental policy to present an alternative vision of 
urban life.‖ Contributors include W.S.K. Cameron (―Can 
Cities Be Both Natural and Successful?‖); Bruce Foltz (―Na-
ture and City in the Greek East‖); Ken Maly (―Biocracy in the 
City: A Contemporary Buddhist Practice‖); Trish 
Glazebrook (―Ecofeminist ‗Cityzenry‘‖); David Seamon 
(―Seeing and Animating the City‖); Robert Mugerauer (―The 
City: A Legacy of Organism-Environment Interaction at Every 
Scale‖); and Sarah King and Ingrid Leman Stefanovic 
(―Children and Nature in the City‖). 
 
Phillip Vannini, ed., 2009. The Cultures of 
Alternative Mobilities. Burlington: Ashgate. 
 
This volume‘s 16 chapters, edited by an anthropologist, focus 
on current mobility experiences. Essay titles include: ―The 
Sociability of the Railway Journey‖ (D. Bissell); ―The Cultur-
al Geography of Flight‖ (L. Budd); ―The Making of Mundane 
Bus Journeys‖ (J. Jain); ―Mobility in Later Life‖ (L. Levin). 
 
Jeremy C. Wells & Elizabeth D. Baldwin, 
2012. “Historic Preservation, Significance, 
and Age Value: A Comparative Phenome-
nology of Historic Charleston and the Near-
by New-Urbanist Community of I’On.” Jour-
nal of Environmental Psychology, vol. 32, 
pp. 384–400. 
 
Using interviews and photo elicitation techniques, this study 
concludes that residents of historic Charleston and the nearby 
New-Urbanist community of I‘On ―value their environments 
in remarkably similar ways. Surprisingly, elements that evoke 
a strong sense of attachment tend to be landscape features 
such as gates, fountains, trees, and gardens rather than build-
ings. The informants valued the ‗mystery‘ that they felt was 
part of the landscape and which consisted of layered elements 
such as fences, gates, and paths, such that these features (in-
cluding buildings) had to be discovered. Lastly the informants 
strongly valued landscapes that showed ‗people care‘ through 
regular maintenance. The essential difference in people‘s ex-
perience and valuation of the new environment (I‘On) and the 
old environment (historic Charleston) is the older environ-
ment‘s ability to instill creative fantasies in the minds of the 
informants based on a hypothetical past of their own creation. 
The informants in I‘On did not share these kinds of mean-
ings.‖ 
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Henri Bortoft (1938–2012) 




n 1972–73, I was a graduate student living in 
England and had the unexpected opportunity 
to participate in a seminar on ―The Hermeneu-
tics of Science‖ taught by Henri Bortoft. 
This learning experience had a profound impact 
on how I understood myself personally and profes-
sionally. Through both the style and content of his 
teaching, Henri demonstrated that there was another 
way of understanding that was more open and in-
tensive than the arbitrary, piecemeal mode of know-
ing presupposed by conventional undergraduate and 
graduate education. 
Henri‘s primary teaching vehicle was Goethean 
science, which he introduced through a series of do-
it-yourself perceptual exercises laid out by Goethe 
in his Theory of Colors (1810). I still have the notes 
in which I copied the key questions that Henri had 
us keep in mind as we looked at and attempted to 
see color phenomena: 
 
 What do I see? 
 What is happening? 
 What is this saying? 
 How is this coming to be? 
 What belongs together? 
 What remains apart? 
 How does this belong together with itself? 
 Is it itself? 
 Can I read this in itself? 
 
Henri played a major role in directing my future 
academic life: an interest in phenomenology and the 
particular mode of phenomenological understanding 
offered by Goethe‘s unique approach to looking and 
seeing.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, Henri would 
write a series of essays on the nature of authentic 
wholeness. These essays would eventually become 
the chapters of his extraordinarily creative The 
Wholeness of Nature, published in 1996. 
To me, this book is one of the great, unheralded 
works of our time—perhaps arriving too soon for 
many people to understand. But I believe firmly that 
this work is a harbinger of a new way of engaging with 
the world that will grow in intensity and significance 
as the 21
st
 century unfolds. 
As we typically are, we don‘t fully encounter the 
world or the things, places, and living beings in it. 
Henri taught a way of seeing that graciously meets 
with the ―Other.‘ In allowing the Other to become more 
and more present and dimensioned, this method of 
knowing not only deepens our sensibilities but facili-
tates an emotional bond of wonderment and concern. 
We see more and, though that understanding, may bet-
ter care for our world. 
One of Henri‘s earliest portraits of this mode of 
seeing and learning is his 1971 essay, ―The Whole: 
Counterfeit and Authentic,‖ published in British phi-
losopher J. G. Bennett‘s quarterly journal, Systematics 
[see pp. 6–11]. There, Henri wrote: 
 
We cannot know the whole in the way in which we know things 
because we cannot recognize the whole as a thing. If the whole 
were available to be recognized in the same way as we recognize 
the things that surround us, then the whole would be counted 
among these things as one of them. So we could point and say 
‗here is this‘ and ‗there is that‘ and ‗that‘s the whole over there‘. 
If we could do this, we would know the whole in the same 
way we know its parts, for the whole itself would simply be num-
bered among its parts, so that the whole would be outside its parts 
in just the same way that each part is outside all the other parts… 
But the whole comes into presence within its parts, so we 
cannot encounter the whole in the same way we encounter the 
parts. Thus we cannot know the whole in the way we know things 
and recognize ourselves knowing things. So we should not think 
of the whole as if it were a thing…, for in so doing, we effectively 
deny the whole inasmuch as we are making as if to externalize 
that which can presence only within the things that are external 
with respect to our awareness of them (vol. 9, no. 2, p. 56). 
 
In her apocryphal 1969 novel, The Four-Gated 
City, British-African writer Doris Lessing defined love 
as the ―delicate but total acknowledgement of what is.‖ 
This description encapsulates the heart of Henri‘s mas-
terful work. 
 
David Seamon is the Editor of EAP.  
I 
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Philosophy as Lived 
 
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic 
 
ore than a decade ago, while an Asso-
ciate Chair in Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Toronto, I encountered in the 
elevator a colleague who had just re-
turned from teaching his first  class in our introducto-
ry, first-year course. He proudly declared that he had 
managed to ―chase away a good third of the class.‖ 
He explained that he only wanted to retain students 
determined to be philosophy specialists. 
My jaw dropped as he left the elevator. In my 
Associate-Chair capacity of what was then the largest 
philosophy department in North America, I still 
hoped our professional aim was to attract and retain 
students in our programs. But, beyond those adminis-
trative musings, I was appalled that my colleague en-
visioned philosophy as a discipline only for ―special-
ists.‖ My view is that philosophical questions are im-
portant to everyone, whether or not one chooses ded-
ication to academic study. In fact, to be human is to 
naturally reflect upon philosophical questions. 
  This colleague retired shortly thereafter but 
many philosophers still think as he did, and many 
journals—even those focusing on interdisciplinary 
environmental ethics—provide opportunities for phi-
losophers to debate exclusively among themselves. 
Few academics possess the talent to communicate 
beyond the discipline in a way that preserves the aca-
demic integrity of ideas while making them accessi-
ble to a broader audience. 
 
enri Bortoft was the very opposite of my phi-
losophy colleague. He was the quintessential 
teacher, able to straddle physics, philosophy 
and the study of the environment. Brilliantly adept at 
taking complex philosophical ideas about hermeneu-
tics and holism and translating them, without loss, to 
non-philosophers, he was able to make these ideas 
legible and exciting. This talent is especially im-
portant in the environmental field, where issues such 
as pollution, climate change, declining biodiversity, 
ecological health risks and loss of sense of place are 
increasingly prevalent and where academics have a 
responsibility to contribute, beyond the comfort of 
their discipline, to solutions to these problems. 
My first encounter with Bortoft‘s writings was 
his 1985 article, ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: 
Finding a Means for Dwelling in Nature‖ [1]. To my 
mind, this article remains one of the best introduc-
tions to hermeneutics, phenomenology, and holism. 
Within philosophical circles, there have been 
important critiques of holism. For instance, in The 
Case for Animal Rights, ethicist Tom Regan claims 
that environmental holism is necessarily ―eco-
fascism‖ because individuals, such as animals, are 
sacrificed to an omnipotent whole, such as an ecosys-
tem [2]. Bortoft, however, demonstrates that authen-
tic holistic thinking has nothing to do with creating a 
dominant ―super-part‖ to rule over individual com-
ponents sacrificed for the good of the whole. On the 
contrary, by brilliantly contrasting the image of a 
hologram with an ordinary photographic plate, he 
shows how the ―whole‖ is properly reflected in the 
―parts.‖ He writes: 
 
If the hologram plate is broken into fragments and one fragment 
is illuminated, it is found that the same three-dimensional opti-
cal reconstruction of the original object is produced. There is 
nothing missing: the only difference is that the reconstruction is 
less well defined…. The entire picture is wholly present in each 
part of the plate, so that it would not be true in this case to say 
that the whole is made up of parts… On the contrary, because 
the whole is in some way reflected in the parts, it is to be en-
countered by going further into the parts instead of by standing 
back from them [3]. 
 
What a lucid example to show how holistic 
thinking is more than merely additive! Bortoft sug-
gests a different kind of understanding that preserves 
the interaction and relation between whole and parts. 
He then makes links to hermeneutics and to the act of 









tal distinction between the whole and the totality. 
When we read a text, for example, 
 
we do not have to store up what is read until it is all collected 
together, whereupon we suddenly see the meaning all at once, in 
an instant… We reach the meaning of the sentence through 
reading the words, yet the meaning of the words in that sentence 
is determined by the meaning of the sentence as a whole…. We 
can say that meaning is hologrammatical [4].  
 
hy do these ideas matter to the study of 
environment? They are important, first, 
because we realize how describing holistic 
phenomena, such as a sense of place, means more 
than only describing its component parts or even 
compiling an inventory of these component parts. To 
think holistically is to think in an essentially non-
reductionist, non-calculative manner. It is to move 
beyond the study of delimited things, uncovering the 
ontological condition of the possibility of the mean-
ing that is revealed in the relation between things, in 
the essence of the individual things themselves, and 
in the taken-for-granted context and interpretive hori-
zon within which things appear in the first place.  
The challenges of such holistic thinking are 
huge: If Bortoft is right (as I think that he is), then 
thinking holistically about problems of urban plan-
ning or global climate change means developing new 
research approaches and study methods. This new 
way of thinking means that, in addition to complex 
engineering or Newtonian scientific models, we need 
to draw on a wider range of sources. Besides climate 
change science, for instance, we need to reflect on 
climate ethics and critically evaluate value systems 
sustaining particular calculative worldviews.  
From Bortoft‘s perspective, we need to rethink 
the way we do science in the first place. In this con-
nection, he turned to Goethe‘s method of ―delicate 
empiricism‖ for guidance. In The Wholeness of Na-
ture, Bortoft explains how we must move beyond the 
―organizing idea‖ of ―naïve empiricism‖ or ―factism‖ 
which assumes that facts are ―independent of an idea-
tional element‖ [5]. Drawing from Goethe‘s ―whole 
way of seeing‖ the unity of the phenomenon, he in-
troduces a new way of scientific thinking to supple-
ment mainstream science—an approach that points 
toward a ―radical change in our awareness of the rela-
tionship between nature and ourselves‖ [6]. 
The Wholeness of Nature is a powerful book that 
speaks for itself, and I invite readers to read this im-
portant work that can dramatically shift one‘s under-
standing of understanding. Also significant is his re-
cently published Taking Appearance Seriously: The 
Dynamic Way of Seeing in Goethe and European 
Thought, which continues to reflect upon phenome-
nology, hermeneutics, and a new vision of science. 
Here we read how ―phenomenology seems to take the 
ground away from under our feet, whilst at the same 
time, gives us the sense of being where we have al-
ways been—only now recognizing it as if for the first 
time‖ [7]. Interestingly, this description of phenome-
nology actually captures the essence of Bortoft‘s own 
reflections, which make us aware, as if for the first 
time, of so much of what we take for granted about 
our relation to the natural world. 
 
enri Bortoft has left a significant legacy that 
enriches the phenomenological literature and 
reflects a profound and unique understanding 
of the meaning of holism. He is a thinker whose writ-
ings will continue to have impact for a long time to 
come. His was a life well lived and his accomplish-
ments deserve to be preserved and celebrated.  
 
Notes 
1. H. Bortoft, ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding a 
Means for Dwelling in Nature,‖ in D. Seamon & R. 
Mugerauer, eds.,  Dwelling, Place and Environment, Dor-
drecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, pp. 281–302; the article was 
reprinted in D. Seamon & A. Zajonc, eds., Goethe‘s Way of 
Science, Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1998, 
pp. 277–98. Though in slightly different form, the article al-
so appears as part I of Bortoft‘s The Wholeness of Nature: 
Goethe‘s Way toward a Science of Conscious Participation 
in Nature, Hudson, NY: Lindesfarne Press, 1996, pp. 1–16. 
2. T. Reagan, The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Press, 2004. 
3. Bortoft, ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes,‖ in Dwelling, 
Place and Environment, p. 282–84. 
4. Ibid, pp. 284–85. 
5. H. Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature, p. 144. 
6. Ibid. 
7. H. Bortoft, Taking Appearance Seriously, Edinburgh, UK: 
Floris Books, 2012, p. 17. 
 
Stefanovic is a Professor of Philosophy and former Director of 
the Centre for Environment at the University of Toronto. Her 
most recent book is The Natural City (Univ. of Toronto Press, 














This text originally appeared as ―The Whole: Counterfeit and Authentic,‖ published in Systematics, vol. 9, no. 
2 (September 1971), pp. 43–73. The sections reprinted here are from pp. 54–57 and pp. 59–64. In the early 
1980s, EAP Editor David Seamon asked Bortoft to revise this 1971 article for a volume he was editing with phi-
losopher Robert Mugerauer. This revision included Bortoft‘s first discussion of Goethean science and was pub-
lished as ―Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding Means for Dwelling in Nature,‖ in D. Seamon and R. 
Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 281–302. We thank 
Jackie Bortoft and Ben Bennett for permission to republish portions of the original article here. 
 
 
he way the whole emerges is by coming 
into presence within parts. The whole 
comes to presence part-ially because it is 
within parts, and it is by im-part-ation, by 
coming into presence within parts, that the whole 
can be whole. The whole is imparted in that it is 
present within parts, which thus become its parts 
and cease to be just bits and pieces. It is by imparta-
tion as a coming into presence within its parts that 
the whole holds to its essence. 
The whole cannot come out without ceasing to 
be whole and becoming all and everything, falling 
into the plural totality of identity in difference. For 
then the whole would become the object (ob-ject: 
that which is thrown out) which is the collection of 
objects, and so cease to be authentically whole. 
Thus it is essential that the whole comes into pres-
ence within parts, so that the whole presences with-
in its parts. 
This tells us something fundamental about the 
whole in a way that shows us the significance of the 
parts. If the whole presences within its parts, then a 
part is a place for the presencing of the whole. If a 
part is to be an arena in which the whole can be pre-
sent, it cannot be any old thing. Parts are not bits 
and pieces because a part is only a part if it is such 
that it can bear the whole. 
There is a useful ambivalence here: ‗to bear‘ 
in the sense of ‗to pass through‘ and ‗to carry‘: and 
‗to bear‘ in the sense of ‗to suffer‘, where this is 
taken in the sense of ‗to undergo‘. By itself the part 
is nothing, not even a part. But the whole cannot be 
whole without the part. The part becomes significant 
itself through becoming a bearer of the whole. 
A part is special, not accidental because it must be 
such as to let the whole come into presence. This spe-
ciality of the part is particularly important because it 
shows us the way to the whole. It clearly indicates that 
the way to the whole is into and through the parts. The 
whole is nowhere to be encountered except in the 
midst of the parts. It is not to be encountered by step-
ping back to take an overview, for it is not over and 
above the parts, as if it were some superior over-
arching part. The whole is to be encountered by step-
ping right into the parts. This is how we enter into the 
nesting of the whole and thus move into the whole as 
we pass through the parts. 
 
his dual movement, into the whole through the 
parts, is demonstrated clearly in the experiences 
of speaking and reading, listening, and writing. 
We can see that, in each case, there is a dual move-
ment: We move through the parts to enter into and un-
der the whole that presences within the parts. When we 
understand, both movements come together. When we 
do not understand, we merely pass along the parts. 
For example, let us consider the interpretation of a 
difficult text. At first encounter, we just pass along the 
parts, reading the words without understanding. To 
come to understand the text, we have to enter into it, 
and this we do in the first place by sounding out the 









ing through the words themselves, not by referring 
the words to some other external text placed in a 
superior position of authority in interpretation. We 
put ourselves into the text in a way that makes us 
available to meaning. 
This hermeneutic approach is the antithesis of 
an analysis that stands back to look upon the text as 
an object to be separated into parts. Analyzing into 
parts is a way of refusing to enter the parts. Entering 
into the parts is an approach into a work that is 
working, and not a retreat to an object of analytical 
knowledge. The whole is nowhere to be encoun-
tered except in the midst of the parts; it is here that 
meaning is to be encountered as a transforming 
presence. It is not to be encountered by stepping 
back to take an overview, for it is not over and 
above the parts like some superior over-arching 
part. The whole is to be encountered only by step-
ping right into the parts. 
 
verything we encounter in the world can be 
said to be either one thing or another, either 
this or that, either before or after, and so on. 
Wherever we look, there are different things to be 
distinguished from one another: this book here, that 
pen there, the table underneath, and so on. Glancing 
about, we recognize a multitude of different things, 
side by side, laid out in mutual self-distinction. 
Each is outside each other, and thus all are separate 
each from every other. 
But in recognizing the things about us in this 
way we, too, by this recognition, are separate from 
and outside each of the things we recognize. Thus 
we find ourselves in recognition laid out side by 
side, together with and separate from, the things we 
recognize. 
This is the familiar spectator awareness. In the 
moment of recognizing a thing, we stand outside of 
that thing and, in the moment of so standing outside 
of that thing, we turn outside into an ‗I‘ that knows 
the thing, for there cannot be an ‗outside‘ without 
the distinction of something being outside of some 
other thing. 
Thus the ‗I‘ of ‗I know‘ arises in the knowing 
of something in the moment of recognition of the 
thing known. By virtue of its origin, the ‗I‘ that 
knows is outside of what it knows. Also, by virtue 
of this same origin, the ‗I‘ that knows is outside of it-
self, for it can know itself in self-awareness.  
Awareness is occupied with things. It is in the 
knowing of things that the ‗I‘ of ‗I know‘ becomes 
self-aware, and hence it is in this knowing that we find 
ourselves in the world. Looked at from the side of 
things, which is where we stand in self-awareness, the 
whole is absent. The whole is absent to awareness be-
cause it is not a thing among other things. 
 
t is for this reason that the whole is easily forgot-
ten, after which its presence is unsuspected. What 
stands before us is the parts, and it is in standing 
before the parts that we recognize ourselves. But the 
whole does not stand before us; we are not its specta-
tor. Since the whole comes into presence within its 
parts and not outside of them, the whole is quite un-
thinglike or un-partlike (think of the difference be-
tween the meaning of a sentence vs. the meaning of a 
word in that sentence). Thus, from the side of aware-
ness, the whole is a no-thing. 
To awareness, no-thing is nothing. This must be 
so, since awareness is awareness of something. But it is 
here that we have a choice, and it is a fateful choice. 
Since no-thing and nothing cannot be distinguished 
within awareness, the whole that is no-thing can be 
taken as a mere nothing, in which case it vanishes in 
the forgetfulness of awareness. When this happens, we 
are left with a world of things alone and the apparent 
task of putting them together to make a whole. 
This taking of the whole that is no-thing to be 
mere nothing is the origin of nihilism. We can say that 
the essence of nihilism is that it takes nothing to be 
nothing and, having already prepared the ground for 
this, we can see immediately the deep truth of this ap-
parent triviality. 
It is a startling consequence of the origin of nihil-
ism in the forgetful vanishing of the whole into mere 
nothing, that all efforts at integration and synthesis are 
inherently nihilistic. This must be so, since the attempt 
to build the whole from the side of separate things re-
inforces the forgetful vanishing of the whole. Such ef-
forts disregard the authentic whole. But it is in just this 
way that the counterfeit wholes of science, technology, 










he other side of the choice is to take the 
whole to be no-thing but not nothing. This is 
difficult for awareness, which cannot distin-
guish no-thing from nothing. Yet we have an illus-
tration immediately at hand with the experience of 
reading. We do not take the meaning of a sentence 
to be a word. The meaning of a sentence is no-word. 
But evidently this is not the same as nothing, for if 
it were we could never read! 
The whole presences within parts. From the 
standpoint of the awareness that grasps the external 
parts, however, the whole is an absence. But it can 
be an active absence inasmuch as we do not try to 
be aware of the whole as if we could grasp it like a 
part, but instead let ourselves be open to be moved 
by the whole. 
Inasmuch as we do not try to be actively aware 
of the whole, so equally we will not be self-aware. 
Our active awareness will be taken up with the 
parts, and we will be aware of ourselves there with 
the parts. But we will not be aware of ourselves be-
ing moved by an active absence, not aware in the 
sense of the self-awareness of the ‗I‘ of ‗I know‘. 
The first step into the wholesome encounter 
comes when ‗I‘ is absent, or occupied with things, 
so that the whole that is an absence with respect to 
awareness comes into presence. We do not notice 
this peculiar non-aware sensitivity to the active ab-
sence. We do not notice it because we are identified 
with the ‗I‘ of awareness, and hence we are depend-
ent upon things and think that presence is merely a 
matter of location of manifestation. But this sensi-
tivity to the active absence accompanies the ordi-
nary awareness that eclipses it, and this sensitivity 
can be developed.  
There are many hermeneutic illustrations of the 
active absence—for example, watching a play, play-
ing a game, reading, writing, and speaking—that are 
similar to the case of the actor playing his part in 
the play. These experiences can each demonstrate 
the reversal that comes in turning from subjective 
awareness into the wholesome encounter. This turn-
ing around, from grasping to being grasped, from 
awareness of an object to letting an absence be ac-
tive, from ‗I‘ to the whole, is a reversal that is the 
first practical consequence of choosing the path that 
assents to the whole as no-thing and not mere nothing. 
 
t is just because of this very reversal that the whole 
must be invisible to the scientific approach as cur-
rently conceived. The paradigm for modern scien-
tific method is Kant‘s ―appointed judge who compels 
the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself 
formulated.‖ 
Science believes itself to be objective, but it is in 
essence subjective because the witness is compelled to 
answer questions that the scientist himself has formu-
lated. The direction is from the scientist as origin to an 
object of enquiry that reflects back what the scientist 
takes to be an answer. 
In this way, the scientist believes that he comes to 
know the unknown. He never notices the delusion that 
consists in his trying to go from the known to the un-
known, and thus attempting to treat the unknown as if 
it were a kind of known. He never notices this because 
he believes he hears the voice of ‗nature‘ speaking, not 
realizing that it is the transposed echo of his own 
voice. The scientist certainly gives ‗nature‘ the last 
word, but only after he himself has had the first word. 
Thus modern science can only approach the whole 
as if it were a thing among things. It must try to grasp 
the whole as its object for interrogation. Trapped in 
subjective awareness, it cannot understand that the au-
thentic direction of discovery is from the unknown to 
the known, because this direction is not open to the 
awareness that holds onto things. This direction be-
comes possible only with the turning around that lets 
the whole—which is absent with respect to aware-
ness—be active. 
So it is that science today is, by virtue of the 
method that is its hallmark, left with a broken world of 
things that it must thus seek to reassemble. Science has 
great need for the whole, but by virtue of its own na-
ture, it must exclude the whole. Thus science must 
build counterfeits by introducing connections, interac-
tions, and relations into the world of things. All such 
attempts ultimately fail because they are based in igno-
rance on the condition that is left when the whole has 
vanished into mere nothing. 
 
he consequences of the whole as mere nothing 
are illustrated in the attempts of science to es-
tablish connections. The essence of connection 









overcome a separation, the ground of the connection 
is to overcome a separation. Thus establishing the 
connection essentially affirms the separation. 
It is no accident that the mathematical method 
is so useful in the attempt to build counterfeits for 
the whole. The core of modern mathematics is the 
axiomatic method, which means starting with a set 
(the ideal representative of nihilism) and defining 
operations upon the members of that set to produce 
patterns of relationships. 
It is this axiomatic method that has now be-
come the very archetype of method in our meta-
physical-scientific-technological civilization, and as 
such it has become ubiquitous. For example, man-
agement attempts to organize and develop business 
and industrial structures by introducing connections 
between supposedly separate elements that have 
been pre-defined. 
Consequently, we should not imagine that the 
subjectivity of science, the loss of the whole, and 
the endeavor to provide counterfeits in ignorance of 
this loss are limited to physics or chemistry. On the 
contrary, this is a foundational condition of all 
forms of thinking currently available to Western 
peoples, including ‗new‘ forms of thought such as 
systems thinking and structural thinking—which are 
not new in any way whatsoever. 
 
t is not a matter of finding new concepts for the 
whole. For where there is a concept, there is an 
idea; and where there is an idea, there is an ob-
ject of thought that represents something from 
which it is quite separate. Hence, there is separation 
and awareness, and the whole is lost. 
The encounter with the whole cannot be under-
stood conceptually. We need a non-conceptual 
thinking of the whole, and this means that we would 
not easily be able to recognize it as thinking. This is 
because such thinking would be non-metaphysical, 
and all thinking of knowledge in science and tech-
nology is fundamentally metaphysical (Heidegger: 
―metaphysics is only the ontology of knowledge‖). 
It is not a matter of giving up metaphysics in a futile 
attempt to retreat, but of going through metaphysics 
and beyond to a thinking which is quite other. It is 
what begins to happen with the turning around into 
the whole. 
The turning around into the whole begins with the 
development of a sensitivity to the active absence, the 
development of an openness that lets the whole come 
to be, not as an object that stands over against us in 
localized manifestation, but as a presence that emerges 
globally so that we find ourselves everywhere within 
it. It is as if we become the object for the whole that 
can never be our object. 
This possibility seems strange because this is how 
the entry into the wholesome encounter seems from the 
side of the awareness of things. It is just because there 
is no place for the whole among the things as objects 
of awareness that the inversion that the wholesome en-
counter constitutes with respect to awareness seems so 
unthinkable. 
 
e can help to mitigate this strangeness by 
exploring a practical case where the way 
into the wholesome encounter seems to be 
blocked. An excellent opportunity is provided by the 
sense of having failed to understand something through 
becoming overcome by detail. When this happens we 
say that we ―can‘t see the wood for the trees.‖ This 
saying has the advantage that it is literally as well as 
figuratively true. 
Let us first explore the literal case. Standing in a 
wood, surrounded by individual trees, we tell ourselves 
that we can‘t see the wood for the trees. This carries 
the implication that it is possible to see the wood, but 
something is getting in the way, namely the trees. Con-
sequently we must introduce a distance between our-
selves and the trees by changing our position and walk-
ing out of the wood. 
Crossing the boundary from inside to outside con-
stitutes a standing back from the wood, but we still fail 
to see anything but trees. If we could climb a conven-
ient hill or hire a helicopter, we could perhaps find a 
position from which to observe the totality of the trees 
enclosed within their own tree boundary. From such a 
vantage point, we would seem to be able to see all of 
the trees taken together, although we would not see all 
of each individual tree. We would have an object be-
fore us that we could see and know that we were see-
ing. We could then point and say ―There‘s the wood,‖ 
and we could do this because we are separated from 










But what is this collected unit but the totality of 
trees! We would still see nothing but trees, just the 
same as when we were inside the wood and com-
plained that the trees impaired our vision of the 
wood itself. The only difference is that from our 
vantage point outside the wood, we would be able 
to see the totality of the trees and not just a few. 
This view, however, would be achieved with 
considerable loss in richness of concrete detail. The 
totality over against which we stood would be a 
poorer object to see compared to what could be seen 
inside the wood, but it would be no more than more 
of the same trees. The attempt to encounter the 
wood by distancing from it results in seeing it as no 
more than the set of objects called trees, so that 
―wood‖ is no more than a class name. This is the 
nihilistic external wood. We might even call it the 
axiomatic or mathematical wood—let the wood W 
be a set of trees, T1, T2, T3… Tn. But it is not the liv-
ing wood.  
Let us consider what happens if we move back 
toward the wood. What happens when we cross the 
boundary to enter into the wood? The only difference 
is that we would be surrounded by trees instead of 
having them collected together in a unit standing over 
against us in one direction only. There would be no 
fundamental change in what is seen (although there 
would be an increased richness of detail) because we 
would continue to see individual trees before us as 
separate, countable objects. 
In this sense, there is no fundamental difference 
between being inside or outside the wood. This dis-
tinction does not mark a discontinuity in experience, 
but merely a relative transposition of orientation. 
Since there is no perceptual change when we are 
inside, it is the same as being outside, and vice versa. 
So it really does look as if ―wood‖ is no more than a 
class name.  
 
ut this is all no more than how it is for the 
observer awareness, which grasps things as 
objects for the self-reflective ‗I‘ to claim to 
see and know. This indifference between inside and 
outside is characteristic of the awareness of things, 
and it fades away as we enter into the wholesome 
encounter. It is important to stress that, for the ob-
server awareness of things, there is no difference 
between being inside or outside of the wood because, 
upon entering a wood, we all sense that there is a differ-
ence but may not notice that this sense does not come 
immediately from what we can see and know. 
Rather, the sense of difference between inside and 
outside comes from the active absence, which is the way 
through which we begin to participate in the presence of 
the wood. There is an entry into the wood that sacrifices 
self-centered awareness and instead lets the wood be. To 
the degree that this happens, we find ourselves being 
met by the wood—not just individual trees in their plac-
es, but the sense of a ubiquitous presence coming toward 
us. 
This is so different to seeing the trees that we can 
begin to sense that ‗wood‘ does have a significance in 
itself, not as an object but as that which presences 
through the trees. The first encounter is like bursting 
through a bubble into a living presence that implodes 
upon us and is ‗there‘ but nowhere, often seeming to be 
more real than we are to ourselves. 
This is how we begin to participate in a presence 
sensed as an active absence that is distinctly different 
from the standing-back awareness of individual trees as 
things. This is how we begin to enter into ‗the within‘ of 
the wood, which is quite distinct from the inside that is 
the same as the outside. The within of the wood is more 
immediate than the inside of the wood because the in-
side is already outside. 
The sensitivity to the wood as an active absence is 
unfortunately often lost through degeneration into sen-
timentality, ‗nice‘ feelings, and silly remarks about how 
lovely everything is. It is by this degeneration that the 
subjective awareness slyly tries to grasp for itself what 
can never belong to it. 
This is possibly the reason why we look upon such 
experiences as pleasing but merely subjective and not to 
be taken seriously—an ironic situation because this 
sensitivity is in fact the beginning of truly objective 
experience, as distinct from the subjectively ―objective‖ 
experience of the awareness and knowledge of things. A 
further reason for doubting the authenticity of such ex-
periences is that the perception cannot be verified in the 
way in which it can with the awareness of things, and it 
is just this thing-based verifiability that constitutes our 
familiar, but nihilistic, criterion for reality. 
 
mportantly for our purposes here, the turning 
around into the wood can go further than the de-









may not often do so but is always possible. There are 
discrete stages of the turning around, each of which is 
a quite different mode of encounter with the whole, 
and each of which is stepped into through a disconti-
nuity. 
The first authentic stage of the wholesome en-
counter is the becoming sensitive to the active ab-
sence, but it is inherent to this stage that it is not 
easily recognized for what it is. 
This stage reaches its limit with the sense of im-
plosion—of an invisible presence coming toward us. 
This stage goes no further, but it is just at this point 
that a discontinuity can occur and a further stage of 
the wholesome encounter can be entered, a stage that 
is a deeper turning around into the whole marked by 
an instantaneous reversal from the experience of 
seeing to the experience of being seen. It is quite 
distinct and unmistakable: it is not a matter of ‗as if 
we were being seen‘ but the actual experience of 
being seen. 
In this mode of sensitivity, the wood is no longer 
an active absence. Rather, we now encounter the 
wood face-to-face, but in a way that is inside-out 
with respect to our awareness of the things around us. 
We experience ourselves being looked at, being 
watched from every direction at once, so that the 
wood implodes upon us, and we experience ourselves 
being seen by the whole wood. 
It is when this happens that we can truly say we 
are within the wood, and that the wood is the living 
whole and not just the totality of the set of trees. We 
cannot go out to the whole to know it because we 
would have to go in every way all at once. But the 
whole can come to us because every direction can 
implode upon us. 
This is the radical reversal that marks the second 
stage of the turning around into the whole. So we can 
never see the wood, only the trees. The wood is invis-
ible to our seeing, but we can be seen by the wood 
and experience ourselves being seen by the wood. It 
is in this respect that we can encounter the wood, 
which sees us through the trees. In this way, we find 
that seeing is far more than only a property of the 
subjective human being. 
 
he wholesome encounter brings about a radi-
cal transformation in our attitude to the natu-
ral environment and the biosphere. Standing 
in the arrogance of subjective awareness, we approach 
nature as dumb and stupid, as something that needs to be 
re-arranged, harnessed, and put to good use by us, whom 
we imagine to be the possessors and sole bearers of 
intelligence. 
But the turning around into the whole demonstrates 
that nature should be entered into watchfully with care. 
It shows that watchfulness is essential in that nature is a 
living presence that can communicate with us if we can 
turn around into the right condition for being spoken to 




Bortoft on phenomenology 
[Phenomenology] refers to… a movement of thinking in which 
the position of attention is shifted from what appears (down-
stream) into the occurring of what occurs (upstream). In particu-
lar, it is concerned with the happening of appearing—with ap-
pearance (read verbally)—so that phenomenology is concerned 
with what appears in its appearing…. 
       Clearly, there cannot be any separation between the happen-
ing of appearing and what appears—i.e., there could not be ‗ap-
pearing‘ without ‗something‘ appearing. But our attention is usu-
ally drawn to what appears to such an extent that we miss the 
happening of appearing. In fact, although it clearly makes no 
sense to try to think of appearance without something thus ap-
pearing, we almost invariably do think of what appears without 
noticing its appearance. 
      As we explore the shift in attention that this requires, to catch 
what appears in the appearing, we find ourselves in a position 
where familiar patterns of thought that we take for granted no 
longer apply. When we focus in the usual way on what appears, it 
seems just natural to say ‗it appears‘. But when our attention 
shifts upstream into what appears in its appearing, then it be-
comes awkward to say ‗it appears‘ because the very form of this 
leads us to think of an ‗it‘ that ‗appears‘. This encourages us to 
think of ‗it‘ as being there already, and then appearing. 
      But this gets it back to front, by imagining ‗it‘ as if it had al-
ready appeared before it ‗appears‘! We would do better to say 
‗appears it‘. This may be bad grammar, but it is better philosoph-
ically because now ‗it‘ emerges for the first time in its appearing, 
and so this avoids the mistake of separating ‗it‘ from ‗appearing‘ 
as if appearing is something that happens to ‗it‘ subsequently.  
      This further implies that appearing is contingent to ‗it‘, in the 
sense of being something that sometimes happens to it but need 
not necessarily do so. Directing our attention into the movement 
of thinking in this way, enables us to see clearly the difference 
between ‗it appears‘ and ‗appears it‘, and to recognize that the 
self-contradictory character of the former encourages us to get 
everything the wrong way round. 
 
—from Taking Appearance Seriously (Edinburgh: Floris Books, 
2012), pp. 95–96 
 
11









This essay originally appeared in the Holistic Science Journal, vol. 1, no. 1 (2011). In the original publication, 
many of the references have no citations. We have incorporated citations we could find in Bortoft‘s other writ-
ings and apologize for missing citations that remain. We thank Jackie Bortoft, Philip Franses, Schumacher 
College, and Earthlinks, the journal‘s on-line publisher, for allowing us to reprint the article here. © 2011, 
2013, Schumacher College and Earthlinks. http://holisticsciencejournal.co.uk/ojs/index.php/hsj. 
 
he practical value of paradox is that it can 
be a doorway to new perceptions. To 
think of paradox as a sign of failure or as 
only an intellectual puzzle greatly under-
estimates its real significance. Through paradox, our 
coarse perceptions and understandings can be trans-
formed into something finer and more subtle. 
I was first introduced to this possibility in the 
1960s by the philosopher J. G. Bennett, for whom 
the attempt to hold opposites together—that is, not 
oscillating from one to the other—was a key to the 
transformation of psychological life to a greater de-
gree of freedom in which real choice and action (in-
stead of just reaction) becomes possible. Bennett 
argued that we must try to hold ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ to-
gether simultaneously (for example, like and dis-
like, agreement and disagreement, and so forth) [1]. 
Bennett believed that paradox was not only 
significant psychologically but was also important 
in philosophical work, where it could lead to a less 
coarse and more subtle form of understanding. He 
pointed out that the basis of Jacob Boehme‘s 
Realdialectik was his insight that ―In yes and no all 
things consist‖—which should certainly not be re-
duced to ―all things consist of yes and no.‖ Bennett 
thought that this was the real basis of Hegel‘s dia-
lectic, and it is interesting that, in his lectures on the 
history of philosophy, Hegel says that Boehme is 
the true founder of modern philosophy, not Des-
cartes. This made a deep impression on me at the 
time, and it has greatly influenced my own work 
and understanding ever since. I will try to provide 
some explication of why. 
One point that often strikes me is the im-
portance of the distinction between passivity and 
receptivity, and how often they are conflated. Ac-
tive and passive are clearly opposites, and we might 
therefore be tempted to think in exclusive terms, as if 
either we are active or we are passive. But being recep-
tive is neither passive nor active in this either/or sense. 
Rather, it is both active and passive at the same time. 
Receptivity is a paradoxical state: When we are recep-
tive, we are ―actively passive‖ and ―passively active.‖ It 
is a more subtle or finer state than being active or pas-
sive. Yet these are both ―ingredients‖ in the state of re-
ceptivity but in a way that unites and transforms them. 
This active/passive situation is a brilliant example of 
what Hegel means by Aufhebung, a term that really has 
no ready equivalent in English. If it were not for the 
fact that we can have this experience of opposites to-
gether, we would never believe it [2].  
 
nderstanding how the either/or of being ac-
tive/passive can be transformed into being re-
ceptive is crucial for understanding Goethe‘s 
way of science [3]. His practical way of proceeding is 
designed to bring a person into a state of receptivity, so 
that it becomes possible for the phenomenon to show 
itself and ―be seen from itself in the very way in which 
it shows itself from itself‖ [4]. But it‘s not just in Goe-
the‘s way of science that the ―paradoxical‖ state of re-
ceptivity is found. We see it also in the encounter with 
meaning in hermeneutics where, as Simon Glendinning 
explains, ―You have to let the text you are reading teach 
you how to read it.‖ 
In the moment of understanding, there is a herme-
neutic reversal where meaning becomes us (not be-
comes us)—i.e., we are becomed by the meaning. This 
is the deeper dimension of phenomenology in which the 
phenomenon is not only something that appears but ap-









encounter the phenomenon as what appears, and not 
as the appearance of what appears [5].  
The philosopher Mauro Carbone, commenting 
on the later philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
drew attention to the need to go beyond the ―grasp‖ 
of the concept (in German the word for concept, 
Begriff, carries with it the meaning ―grasp‖) to the 
gesture of welcoming that receives something and is 
more in tune with the Latin meaning of ―concept‖ 
(concipio—to be pregnant; to create a space for 
something). Empiricism construes the concept as 
passive, while idealism construes it as active. 
Paradox is inevitable because, as Bergson 
pointed out, ―the human intellect feels at home 
among inanimate objects, more especially among 
solids‖ so that ―our concepts have been formed on 
the model of solids; our logic is pre-eminently, the 
logic of solids.‖ The key characteristic of the 
―world of bodies‖ is separateness, which means that 
it is the world of independent entities self-enclosed 
and external to one another. It is the quantitative 
world because, as Aristotle argued, quantity is that 
which has parts external to one another. I like the 
image that the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin gave 
of the situation when he said that the mind is basi-
cally at home in the world of medium-size dry 
goods. 
This is a very limited domain, and it is when 
we try to fit things into this restricted framework 
that we find ourselves confronted by paradox. This 
does not mean that paradox is ―impossible,‖  ―mys-
tical,‖ or just ―tiresome‖ (the British response). 
What it means is that our thinking is too restricted, 
and the form that the paradox takes will quite possi-
bly give us some clue as to the way in which think-
ing needs to be transformed.  
 
efore mentioning my own experience with 
the idea of ―the one and the many,‖ I want 
to highlight my favorite illustration: Edwin 
Abbott‘s Flatland and the mysterious case of the 
sphere [6]. Abbott‘s  story concerns a society of 
creatures entirely confined to a two-dimensional 
surface, and what happens to one of them—a 
square—when one day a sphere from the world of 
three dimensions appears in his two-dimensional 
world. The sphere passes through Flatland, but what 
the hapless square experiences is that a point sud-
denly appears out of nowhere, turns into a circle of ex-
panding diameter, reaches a maximum size, and then 
begins to shrink back to a point and vanishes. He is 
very puzzled, and when he says aloud to himself ―What 
is this?‖ the sphere, who is not supposed to communi-
cate with Flatlanders, announces, ―I am a sphere.‖ 
Of course, this information doesn‘t help the befud-
dled square at all. When the sphere tells the square that 
he must go ―up,‖ the Flatlander has no such concept 
and can only try to make sense of ―up‖ in terms of his 
own familiar, but limited, experience. ―Do you mean go 
‗north‘?‖ he asks the sphere, drawing on his knowledge 
of two-dimensional mapping with a compass. 
After struggling to get the square to understand the 
paradox of ―go up, yet not north,‖ the sphere loses pa-
tience and casts the unprepared square out of Flatland 
into the sphere‘s world of three dimensions. This shock 
is too much for the square and ―blows his mind.‖ He is 
eventually sent to an asylum where he joins other ―in-
sane‖ Flatlanders muttering about a ―higher dimension‖ 
that every sane Flatlander knows doesn‘t exist.  
 
n the world of bodies, ―one‖ and ―many‖ are mutu-
ally exclusive—either something is one (and not 
many) or many (and not one). This is the Flatland 
version of ―the one and the many.‖ But there is another 
dimension of the one and the many that seems paradox-
ical because it is one and many at the same time. If, in-
stead of either one or many, we hold both together, we 
can come to the experience of an intuitive perception in 
which we see intensively instead of extensively. We see 
intuitively in another dimension, which is the intensive 
dimension of ―multiplicity in unity‖ instead of the ex-
tensive dimension of many separate ones. 
For example, when a hologram is broken into parts, 
each part projects the same image as the whole holo-
gram, though with less clarity. There is not one and an-
other one, but one and the other of the one. ―Multiplici-
ty in unity‖ means that there can be multiplicity within 
unity without fragmenting the unity because each is the 
very same one and not another one [7]. The hologram 
and other examples—e.g., vegetative propagation—can 
become ―templates for thinking‖ intensively as well as 
extensively [8]. By visualizing these examples, one can 
practice shifting from the extensive to the intensive di-
mension of the ―the one and the many‖ and back again. 
I emphasize this intuitive practice of seeing what 









cause the possibility is largely overlooked in educa-
tional practices today. Examples of the need for this 
kind of thinking abound. The intensive dimension 
of ―the one and the many‖ is essential for under-
standing Goethe‘s notion of plant metamorphosis 
―by which one and the same organ presents itself to 
us in manifold forms‖ [9]. Similarly, we find that in 
the unity of organic nature the diversity is the unity. 
 
his paradoxical form of ―the one and the 
many‖ is also found in the philosophy of 
hermeneutics, which is concerned with the 
phenomenon of understanding written and artistic 
works—paintings, music, theater, and so forth. Here 
also we find a kind of intensive distinction, which 
seems to be characteristic of the phenomenon of 
something coming into expression—e.g., a work 
and its presentation, expressive language, and inter-
pretation. Whatever the expressive medium, we find 
what Gadamer refers to as ―a distinction that is not 
really a distinction at all.‖ In other words, there is a 
paradoxical distinction that is difficult to grasp, so 
one instead readily falls into dualism. What kind of 
distinction is a distinction that is not a distinction? It 
is an intensive distinction that takes the form of nei-
ther one nor two and at the same time both one and 
two. We need to think in a way that does not sepa-
rate into two but at the same time does not collapse 
into one. 
We can develop this capacity by philosophical 
work, but it‘s a bit like trying to walk along a tight-
rope—most of the time we fall off on one side or 
the other. For example, in the case of language and 
meaning, we either ―separate into two‖ and think of 
the meaning as already formed. Or we assume 
meaning to be a function of words—i.e., we ―col-
lapse into one‖—and think of meaning as simply 
being produced by the words. Both misrepresent the 
lived experience of expression, which is pre-
separation and for which the distinction between 
language and meaning is intensive. When we do 
glimpse this intuitively, it seems so simple—and 
then we fall off the tightrope again. 
A key point to realize is that lived experience—
i.e. experience as lived—always seems paradoxical 
to the way in which we think of experience after it 
has been lived—which is the basis for the ―common 
sense‖ description of experience that seems so ―ob-
vious‖ but misleads us. A very clear example of this is 
seen in the phenomenon of expressive behavior, where 
we usually either fall into mind-body dualism or reduc-
tionist behaviorism. Wittgenstein shows us the inten-
sive distinction that enables behavior itself to be ex-
pressive without any need for meaning to be added ex-
tensively. 
 
hen it comes to science, paradox is to be ex-
pected. Think of light in the special theory of 
relativity. It is a consequence of the universal 
constancy of the measured speed of light that light itself 
is not subject to the space-time separation characteristic 
of material bodies. If, for example, we consider the dis-
tant star Betelgeuse, some 240 light years from us, for 
light there is no separation between the star and our 
eye. Light itself is before separation, and it is a conse-
quence of the null-interval that the universe for light is 
an intensive point including all within itself. 
To the logic of solid bodies, for which separability 
is a defining characteristic, such non-separability is 
highly paradoxical. But imagine a being of light. For 
such a light-being, the world of bodies would be impos-
sible to imagine, and the idea of separability would be 
highly paradoxical. If we say, therefore, that the behav-
ior of light is paradoxical, we should not imagine that 
this paradoxicality is somehow intrinsic to light itself. 
In whatever form it takes, non-separability will al-
ways seem paradoxical to us in the world of bodies 
where separability is the major taken-for-granted quali-
ty. In quantum mechanics, the superposition of states 
indicates that paths separable for us (e.g., for the photon 
in an interferometer) are non-separable for the photon. 
The behavior of a single indivisible photon seems para-
doxical to us, but it is not paradoxical to the photon. 
 
Notes 
1. J. G. Bennett, The Dramatic Universe, four volumes. London: 
Stoddard and Watkins, 1956–1966. 
2. H. Bortoft, Taking Appearance Seriously, Edinburgh: Floris 
Books, 2012, p. 26, p. 181. 
3. See H. Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature, Hudson, NY: Lindes-
farne Press, 1996. 
4. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, NY: Harper Row, 1062, p. 58. 
5. Bortoft 2012, ch. 4. 
6. E. A. Abbott, Flatland, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2010 [originally 1884]. 










Making Toronto’s Yonge Street Great  
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bout a year ago, I reported on my initial 
experience with urban design in down-
town Toronto [1]. A developer proposed 
twin 58-story condominium towers ten 
meters from the study window of my condominium. 
This was downtown Toronto in the midst of a condo 
boom that‘s continuing. My early reaction was 
strongly negative, but I recognized that a NIMBY 
(―Not In My Back Yard‖) response was unlikely to 
carry much weight. I turned to urban design and re-
ported on my early experience. 
More than a year has passed. Much has 
changed and the towers have yet to be either ap-
proved or withdrawn. I feel that I‘ve gained a much 
better appreciation for the local planning process. It 
may be unwise to generalize from one major North 
American city in the midst of an almost unprece-
dented condo building boom, but some of the in-
sights gained may be of value elsewhere. It‘s that 
hope which informs this essay. 
A bit about the Toronto planning situation may 
help set the stage. In the early 2000s, Ontario decid-
ed to confront urban sprawl and published Places to 
Grow in 2006, a document it has continued to up-
date [2]. A greenbelt was established around Toron-
to. New development was discouraged in estab-
lished neighborhoods and outside the greenbelt but 
encouraged along major transportation corridors. 
In practice, this document has stimulated con-
dominium development along these major corridors, 
including Yonge Street. A race has begun to con-
struct as many downtown condos as possible, par-
ticularly the construction of ―glass brutalism‖—
dense, relatively inexpensive, high-rise structures of-
fering attractive views, at least initially until some 
newer construction visually interferes. 
It was just such ―glass brutalism‖ development A 
―Glass brutalism‖ on Toronto‘s Yonge Street, two blocks  from 
similar proposed towers  that would be ten meters away from 
the author's study window. Photo: Robert Fabian. 
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proposed for outside my window. Centrally located 
on Toronto‘s busy Yonge Street between the main 
downtown ―epicenters,‖ the two towers would liter-
ally be on top of the main north-south Toronto sub-
way line. The developer‘s argument was clear, and 
strong. I hoped to identify forces that could be ar-
rayed to moderate this rampant commercialism and 
to bring some contextual sensitivity to the design. 
 
A Missing Vision 
Toronto does have an Official Plan, but it's very 
broad brush. The city also has Tall Buildings guide-
lines, but their initial version left my portion of the 
city ―blank.‖ I've been told that this was a political 
compromise allowing the other guidelines to be 
adopted—a plausible explanation. As I became 
more involved with the situation, I learned that up-
dated versions of both the Official Plan and the Tall 
Buildings guidelines were in development. As a re-
sult of the condo towers proposed outside my win-
dow, there was official recognition for the need of a 
master plan specifically addressing my part of the 
city. A North Downtown Yonge Street Planning 
Framework is also under development. 
All these plans and 
guidelines are colored by the 
Ontario Municipal Board, 
which has considerable pow-
er to overturn any of the 
city‘s planning decisions. 
This board is a quasi-legal 
body whose decisions cannot 
be appealed, except on the 
narrowest of grounds. The 
board only recognizes ―ex-
perts‖ as having opinions that 
warrant serious considera-
tion. Developers have a big 
edge in this regard because 
they employ the vast majority 
of the individuals whom the 
OMB recognizes as ―ex-
perts.‖ 
Against this pro-
development bias, how are 
alternate concerns given 
voice? The city did run something they called a ―cha-
rette,‖ which I attended. Unfortunately, this event was 
a pale imitation of an intense, several-day interactive 
design process. The charette lasted less than a day. At-
tendees were given the opportunity to describe our 
views on pre-defined topics. The first feedback came 
months later and consisted of ―them‖ telling ―us‖ what 
they heard. There was no sense of an interactive, in-
cremental, or iterative design process [3]. 
Our local Councilor did initiate two working 
groups, one to consider the North Downtown Yonge 
Street Planning Framework; the other to consider the 
development proposed outside my study window. I 
was a member of both working groups. What I notice 
is that non-experts have what I would call a ―contextu-
al problem.‖ We don't have the established expertise to 
be allowed to argue from our best understanding of the 
context.  
What‘s missing was a ―vision‖ for our Toronto 
district—specifically, for North Downtown‘s stretch of 
Yonge Street. This thoroughfare was the first street in 
Ontario and Canada‘s longest—some 1,800 km. Yonge 
was Toronto‘s main commercial street by the late nine-
teenth century, and there are many remaining buildings 
from that era. It was Toronto‘s parade street and where 
A typical block on Yonge Street. The nineteenth-century buildings are protected by heritage leg-
islation but only to a limited lot depth. Photo: Robert Fabian. 
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Toronto went to celebrate. Retail functions along 
―our‖ section of the street, however, have fallen on 
hard times.  
Less than two kilometers long, the section of 
Yonge Street I‘m concerned with should aspire to 
what urban designer Allan Jacobs refers to as ―Great 
Street status‖ [4]. This stretch of street already has a 
clearly recognized southern anchor–Dundas Square, 
which is Toronto‘s Times Square [5]. The street‘s 
southern portion running from Dundas Square was a 
focal point of this year‘s ―Celebrate Yonge!‖  [6] 
and the northern end is naturally anchored where 
Yorkville Street meets Yonge [7].  
If developers‘ enthusiasm for building on and 
adjacent to Yonge Street could be properly har-
nessed, we should be able to move the street in a 
good direction. To that end, the local neighborhood 
associations developed a ―vision‖ for our stretch of 
Yonge Street. This has the great advantage that non-
experts can reach supportable conclusions about 
what makes sense for the street, and what doesn‘t. 
It‘s no longer a game in which only expert opinion 
counts. Explicate the context and non-experts can 
meaningfully enter the game. Our ―Vision‖ has five 
major elements, each of which I discuss in turn. 
 
1. Making a “Great Street” 
Yonge Street has the history and environmental pos-
sibilities to become a ―great street.‖ Drawing espe-
cially on Allan Jacobs‘ ideas, we want to see the 
following place features enhanced by all new con-
struction: 
 
 Pedestrians can walk with leisure, and users are present in 
sufficient numbers for safety but with enough space that 
one can walk at a comfortable pace. 
 The street ―walls‖ are well defined; buildings don‘t loom 
over the street but do provide a definition of comfortable 
containment. 
 At both ends, this section of Yonge has anchor ―places‖ 
providing a recognizable starting point and terminus that 
both work as ―places‖ for people. 
 The street engages the eye through a rich variety of 
textures, patterns, and shapes. 
 The building designs are complementary; they ―work‖ 
with each other without rote duplication. 
 The buildings are constructed of high-quality materials 
and incorporate a high degree of craftsmanship. 
 Through the use of trees, plantings, and so forth, there is a 
―green‖ presence along the street and at the entrances to 
side streets. 
 There is a rich retail and recreational diversity incorporating 
different kinds of shops and public spaces. 
 The street features ―great details‖—for example, an unusual 
entry way, striking windows, or handsome benches. Great 
features stand out and contribute to a distinctive 
environmental ambience. 
 There are recognized ―places‖ along the street and adjacent to 
the street. These places are destinations and locations where 
pedestrians want to spend time. 
 
2. Appropriate Design 
The design of new construction is perhaps the greatest 
challenge for our stretch of Yonge Street. Inappropriate 
new construction significantly reduces the street‘s po-
tential and may have a serious ripple effect across oth-
er downtown neighborhoods. Construction is not only 
about profit but should also enhance the built environ-
ment for its residents and users.  
One way to identify appropriate design elements is 
through ―patterns‖ as described in architect Christo-
pher Alexander‘s Pattern Language [8]. By ―patterns,‖ 
I mean positive design elements contributing to the life 
and ambience of Yonge Street. One approach is that 
new construction draw on positive patterns already 
found along the street, though these patterns should be 
supplemented with new patterns, provided they en-
hance the ―language‖ of ―great‖ design along the 
street. Whether drawing on existing or new patterns, 
new buildings should be harmonious with what already 
exists and extend the design language in positively dis-
tinguishing ways. 
 
3. Enhanced Public Realm 
The public realm along my stretch of Yonge Street in-
cludes the street itself as well as side streets and paral-
lel alleys, or ―laneways‖ as we call them in Canada. 
There are a few small, linear parks above some of the 
Yonge Street subway, and there is hope for a major 
park just off Yonge Street at 11 Wellesley West. It is 
the street, side streets, and laneways, however, that are 
the most critically important elements in the public 
realm. 
A key issue is that the foot traffic on Yonge con-
tinues to increase, and there are many more pedestrians 
than motorists. This pedestrian volume is sure to in-
crease even more as thousands of new condo units re-
quire access to the street. To deal with these additional 
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One block of the 2012 summer event, ―Celebrate Yonge!‖ Photo: Robert Fabian. 
users, we need to recognize Yonge as a place for 
pedestrians and cyclists as well as for motorists. 
Because of the added foot traffic, more of the street 
needs to be accessible to pedestrians. During this 
past summer‘s ―Celebrate Yonge!‖ one traffic lane 
of the street was opened to pedestrians, and this 
successful shift demonstrates that at least one vehi-
cle lane could be given over to pedestrians. 
But raw space is not the most important factor. 
Along too much of Yonge, there is little green pres-
ence. The adjacent neighborhood association 
demonstrated what‘s possible with their Bay Street 
bioswale project, comprised of handsome planted 
―troughs‖ that capture and clean surface runoff. If 
sidewalks were widened, a portion of the new space 
could be devoted to a bioswale running along our 
stretch of Yonge.  
The laneways on either side of Yonge Street are 
currently unattractive and under-utilized. Several 
cities—Melbourne is one striking example [9]—
have retrofitted their laneways to provide interesting 
and inviting pedestrian-friendly retail environments. 
Improving Yonge‘s laneways would enhance the 
retail environment and contribute to an invigorated 
public realm. 
 
4. Innovative Retail 
Yonge Street‘s retail functions have been troubled for 
some time. There are relatively few long-standing 
businesses and, instead, many ―opportunistic‖ retail 
outlets—cash stores, beauty parlors, tattoo emporiums, 
sex shops, and so forth. On the other hand, pedestrian 
volume is high and continues to increase as new resi-
dents occupy condominiums. Street violence is low. 
Yonge Street is the central pedestrian corridor in down-
town Toronto and should support a better mix of retail. 
Several undermining economic factors are at 
work. Real-estate land values have reached unsustain-
able levels—an acre of land on or near Yonge Street 
now fetches 50 million dollars or more. To keep pace, 
rents and property taxes increase. At the same time, 
traditional retail businesses are challenged by the in-
ternet, global brands, and big-box discount pricing. 
Providing ever more expensive space for large-scale 
retail is unlikely to generate strong, vibrant retail. 
If no special provisions are made for Yonge Street, 
there is little reason to be optimistic about its retail fu-
ture. This poses a fundamental challenge because vi-
brant, successful retail must be an essential element in 
an attractive, walkable Yonge Street. Though there is 
considerable developer interest in the street, most spe-
cialize in condominiums 
and have little experience 
in including space that can 
house the kind of retail 
necessary to make Yonge 
commercially successful. 
New York City faced a 
similar challenge on its 
―Upper West Side Neigh-
borhood Retail Streets.‖ In 
June, 2012, city officials 
established revised zoning 
restrictions relating to new 
construction and building 
expansion on the neigh-
borhood‘s retail streets. 
This approach might pro-
vide a model for retail de-
velopment on Yonge, 
which is already recog-
nized as a ―special charac-
ter street.‖ Possibilities 
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 A maximum store-front width, at least for a significant 
fraction of any new or rehabilitated buildings; 
 A minimum store-window exposure, including minimum 
vertical and horizontal dimensions; 
 A minimum percentage of retail space to accommodate 
bars and eateries and including kitchen-ventilation 
systems (which, in high-rise buildings, are often difficult 
to retrofit). 
 
Relatively narrow store fronts attract the eye 
and invite pedestrians to advance along the street. 
Large windows encourage window displays that 
engage the eye and animate the street. Restaurant 
accommodation is to preserve Yonge as an attractive 
dining district. Also useful would be financial in-
centives that encourage retail innovation, at least 
until our stretch of Yonge comes to be recognized as 
a ―pedestrian retail destination.‖ 
Yonge Street will not draw much automobile 
traffic to its retail functions because parking is diffi-
cult and expensive.  Instead, the street should be-
come one of the important pedestrian destination for 
Toronto retail. Three financial provisions that might 
help this happen are, first, requiring that a portion of 
new or enhanced retail be reserved for start-up or 
new retail ventures; second, placing these ventures 
in less costly locations—e.g., along laneways or in 
special-kiosk retail areas; and, third, offering subsi-
dies to freeze rents and taxes at pre-new-
development levels. 
 
5. Necessary Limits 
―Necessary limits‖ refer to stipulations relating to 
building height and residential protections. If a new 
building steps back from the Yonge Street property 
line no more than 10 meters, it should not be al-
lowed to rise more than 50 meters above the build-
ing‘s podium, which should be limited to three sto-
ries or fourteen meters. For buildings with deeper 
step back, heights could be greater. Most broadly, 
new-building height should be limited to five times 
the step back, plus the fourteen-meter podium 
height. This requirement would, in most instances, 
place a twenty-story limit on buildings that step 
back only ten meters and a 35-story limit on build-
ings that step back 20 meters. The goal would be 
providing enough height to make some new devel-
opment profitable but respect the street experience of 
residents and pedestrians. 
Especially important in regard to residential 
neighbors is requiring a minimal horizontal separation 
between new buildings and the windows of any exist-
ing residential units. The city already recognizes the 
importance of a 25-meter separation between residen-
tial towers, and a horizontal separation of at least 12.5 
meters would be appropriate and require a setback of 
6.25 meters on either side of the logical line separating 
the old from the new. That marker would be the prop-
erty line if the two properties were immediately adja-




The Yonge Street vision I‘ve laid out here has made 
significant headway. The neighborhood associations on 
both sides of our stretch of Yonge Street have endorsed 
the vision, which appears with few alterations in the 
draft version of the forthcoming North Downtown 
Yonge Street Planning Framework. Partly because of 
our vision statement, a review panel of experts con-
cluded that a redesign was necessary for the condomin-
ium proposed near my study window. At this point, the 
Ontario Municipal Board has not delivered their re-
view of the Yonge Street document, but the signs all 
point to a distinctly better building outside my window. 
The current proposal is for a 52-story tower and a 22-
story tower rather than the original twin 58-story struc-
tures. Just as importantly, Toronto is closer to a design 
and planning vision that moves Yonge Street in the 
right direction. 
This process has taken more than a year and is still 
incomplete. It is troubling that getting this far required 
a considerable amount of dedicated work for which too 
few local residents have time. Fortunately, there are 
several of us who are retired or semi-retired. We have 
the leisure to attend meetings and draft position papers. 
This advocacy process, however, should not depend on 
unpaid volunteers. Even if the resources were not 
available to mount a full charette, that's hardly the only 
evaluative and envisioning instrument that the city and 










A Better Planning Process 
In advocating for a better Yonge Street, I have found 
that one promising approach is ―Open Space Tech-
nology,‖ which lays out the elements, processes, and 
stages whereby a committed group of individuals can 
explore and find solutions for a particular problem—
in the present case, providing a proposal for a better 
Yonge Street [10]. Groups as small as a dozen or 
larger than one thousand have successfully undertak-
en an Open Space Technology conference. There is, 
however, one critical pre-condition in that sponsors 
must be prepared to accept whatever emerges from 
their work. This approach to problem-solving is dif-
ferent from charettes, which have the ―virtue‖ that 
planners and architects are in control. There is on-
going dialogue between charette participants and ex-
perts, but the latter ultimately make final decisions. 
Open Space Technology conferences are driven by 
the passion and commitment of those who choose to 
participate. The ―experts‖ do not have the last word. 
I‘m not arguing here for an Open Space Tech-
nology conference per se. Rather, I‘m arguing that we 
need alternatives to traditional planning. I find strong 
parallels with the planning process for systems (my 
professional work before retirement). Traditionally, 
systems were planned by experts—i.e., system ana-
lysts—who develop extensive requirements and spec-
ifications that are then agreed to by users. The pro-
grammers would then proceed to build a system in-
corporating those requirements and specifications. All 
too often the result is much less than optimal because 
the system confronts the ―uncertainty principle for 
systems‖ [11]. 
What‘s required is an iterative, incremental ap-
proach. As the stakeholders begin to see the emerging 
system, they develop a much better understanding of 
what the system should do and how that doing can be 
actualized. The same dynamic seems to be at work in 
urban planning. 
Actually, the situation is worse in urban plan-
ning. The stakeholders often can't really understand 
what should be in the plan before they see what's be-
ing proposed for the plan. That's a central element in 
the justification for a conventional charette. There is a 
growing body of social-science research that exam-
ines alternative interactive, iterative approaches [12]. 
Open Space Technology is not the only alternative, but it 
does seem particularly appropriate to the urban planning 
process—specifically, to the process of developing a vi-
sion for a city district like our stretch of Yonge Street. 
Getting the plan right is challenging, and uncer-
tainty is still possible. Our built forms require flexibil-
ity so that incremental adjustments can be made in 
practice [13]. One of my concerns is that the engineer-
ing and the ownership structure of our new condo tow-
ers will make any incremental improvements and addi-
tions extremely difficult. Professionals and citizens 
have found creative ways to repurpose many older 
buildings but will the same be possible for the new 
condo towers? An answer is far from certain. 
My learning process began in May, 201l—the 
month the developer announced his intention to con-
struct the condo towers outside my window. I've come 
a considerable distance. I almost understand how plan-
ning works and doesn't work in downtown Toronto. I 
can see traces of my handiwork in the planning now 
proposed for my stretch of Yonge Street. For me, that‘s 
an attractive start.  
 
Notes 
1. R. Fabian, ―Discovering Urban Design,‖ Environmental and 
Architectural Phenomenology, vol. 23, no. 1 (2011), pp. 4–6. 
2. www.placestogrow.ca. 
3. On the charette process, see the National Charette Institute 
website at: www.charetteinstitute.org/ 




8. C. Alexander, S. Ishikawa, & M. Silverstein, A Pattern Lan-
guage, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977. 
9. On Melbourne‘s remarkable efforts to revitalize the downtown 
through enlivening laneways, see: 
 http://www.streetfilms.org/melbourne/. 
10. For a useful overview, go to:  
  http://www.openspaceworld.com/users_guide.htm. 
11. I first used the term in 1998: ―It is impossible to know both 
the changes a new system will bring and the functions the sys-
tem needs to perform.‖  http://fabian.ca/modest/modest.html. 
12. P. Holman, T. Devane, & S. Cody, The Change Handbook, 2
nd 
Edn., San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2007. 
13. See Stewart Brand‘s How Buildings Learn, NY: Penguin, 
1995. 
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 A Virtual Conversation 
 
J. Kevin Byrne with Annie Mok 
 
Byrne is a Professor of Visual-
ization at the Minneapolis Col-
lege of Art and Design. Mok is 
an illustrator and cartoonist. 
Byrne writes: ―EAP readers 
might like a look at a ‗comic 
art‘ interpretation that brings 
together philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, environmental 
sculptor Kinji Akagawa, de-
signer Herbert Bayer, the Da-
lai Lama, and me in a virtual 
conversation on a hilltop in 
Aspen, Colorado. This cartoon 
ends a bit like a ‗Star Trek‘ epi-
sode in which characters on 
the spaceship Enterprise‘s ‗ho-
lodeck‘ are set to a ‗permanent 
loop‘ inside the ship‘s computer 
flash drive. Like that episode, I 
tried to give this cartoon a 
slight feeling of dénoue-
ment….‖ kbyrne@mcad.edu; 
http://anniemakesstories.com. 
Images and text © 2011, 2013, 
J. Kevin Byrne. For more on 
Byrne‘s work, go to: 
www.mnartists.org/article.do?rid=284362. 
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